The Cold War
Different European powers had different attitudes to decolonisation after 1945: some, such as the British, decided to leave while others wished to preserve their Empires, in part (the French) or whole (the Portuguese).

European powers adopted different attitudes to different regions/countries; eg British withdrawal from Asia came much more quickly after 1945 than from Africa.

The process of decolonisation was relatively peaceful in many cases; it led to revolutionary wars in others (Algeria, Malaya and Angola), depending on the attitudes of the colonial power and the nationalist movements.
### Key Points II:
Principal acts of European decolonisation 1945-80

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Colonial state</th>
<th>Year of Independence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>1947</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>1947</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burma</td>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>1948</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>Holland</td>
<td>1949</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>1957</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaya</td>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>1957</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French</td>
<td>African colonies</td>
<td>1960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zaire</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>1960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>1962</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>1963</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Key Points II:
#### Principal acts of European decolonisation 1945-80

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Colonial state</th>
<th>Year of Independence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>1974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>1975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape Verde</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>1975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sao Tome</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>1975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>1975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>1980</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From Ch. Four, Baylis and Smith (ed.) *The Globalization of World Politics* (2ed.)
Key Points III: The Cold War

- There are **disagreements** about when the cold war started, why, and who was responsible.
- The cold war began in Europe with the failure to implement the agreements reached at **Potsdam and Yalta**.
- Distinct phases can be seen in East-West relations during which tension and the risk of direct confrontation grew and receded.
- Some **civil and regional wars** were intensified and prolonged by superpower involvement; others may have been prevented or shortened.
- The end of the cold war has not resulted in the abolition of **nuclear weapons**.

From Ch. Four, Baylis and Smith (ed.) *The Globalization of World Politics* (2ed.)
## Key Points V:
Principal Arms Control And Disarmament Agreements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Treaty/agreement</th>
<th>Weapon/delivery system</th>
<th>Signed Parties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Geneva protocol 100+</td>
<td>Chemical weapons : bans use</td>
<td>1925</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limited Test Ban Treaty 100+</td>
<td>Bans atmospheric, underwater, outer-space nuclear tests.</td>
<td>1963</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear Non-Proliferation 100+</td>
<td>Limits spread of Proliferation Treaty nuclear weapons</td>
<td>1968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biological Weapons 80+</td>
<td>Bans production/use 1972 Convention</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Key Points V:
**Principal Arms Control And Disarmament Agreements**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agreement</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SALT I</td>
<td>limits Strategic arms*</td>
<td>1972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US/USSR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABM Treaty</td>
<td>limits Anti-Ballistic missiles</td>
<td>1972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US/USSR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SALT II</td>
<td>limits Strategic arms*</td>
<td>1979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US/USSR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermediate Nuclear</td>
<td>Bans two categories</td>
<td>1987</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US/USSR</td>
<td>Forces Treaty of land-based missiles</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>START I</td>
<td>reduces strategic arms*</td>
<td>1990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US/USSR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* strategic arms are long range weapons

From Ch. Four, Baylis and Smith (ed.) *The Globalization of World Politics* (2ed.)

THE BIRTH OF THE COLD WAR

- COLD WAR IS OVER-DETERMINED: MANY FACTORS CONTRIBUTED
- BUT COLD WAR IS NOT INEVITABLE
- WHY IS UNDERSTANDING THE BIRTH OF THE COLD WAR IMPORTANT?
  -- EVOLUTION OF ENTIRE WORLD SHAPED BY CONFLICT
  -- PREVENT IT FROM HAPPENING AGAIN
Setting the Scene
EMERGENCE IS SURPRISINGLY UNEXPECTED

United States

Extensive War Time Collaboration

Soviet Union

- U.S. CONTINUALLY PRAISES HEROIC SOVIET EFFORT
- RE-SOCIALIZATION OF THE AMERICAN PUBLIC

- THREE-QUARTERS OF ALL NAZI SOLDIERS FALL FIGHTING SOVIETS
- SOVIET WARTIME DEATHS FAR EXCEED U.S.
DESTRUCTION OF COMMON THREATS: GERMANY AND JAPAN → REDISTRIBUTION OF POWER: A BIPOLAR WORLD → BALANCE OF POWER

SOVIET’S CONTRIBUTE: SUPPORT COMMUNISTS IN FRANCE & ITALY
U.S. CONTRIBUTES: DROPS ARMS INTO UKRAINE

USSR IS CONTINENTAL POWER; FORWARD BASES FOR THE U.S. (+)
BUT NO SHARED BORDERS; NO CHECKERBOARD ALLIANCES (-)

SECURITY DILEMMA
GEOGRAPHY
The Potemkin Village analogy originates with the story of a Russian prince named Grigori Potemkin, a favourite of the famous Tsarina of Russia, Catherine the Great. Potemkin had helped organize her imperial tour of the southern provinces of the Russian Empire in 1787, taking great efforts to make the tour as spectacular as possible. This effort included the construction of attractive false fronts, or façades, for many of the buildings and towns along the Tsarina’s route to impress Catherine with the prosperity of the empire, a prosperity that was at least in part an illusion manufactured by Potemkin. This story is used as an analogy for the state of the Soviet Union by the 1980s, a Potemkin Village, a superpower that was in truth a superpower in military terms only. This façade of strength, while significant, obscured the fact that the Soviet Union was sliding deeper into economic decline, with most of its citizens cynical about the political and economic system and struggling to maintain their meagre standard of living.
STATE/SOCIETAL EXPLANATIONS

SECRETIVE AND AUTOCRATIC NATURE OF SOVIET GOVERNMENT

SOVIET COMMUNIST IDEOLOGY

INTEREST GROUP PRESSURE: THE POLISH VOTE

ECONOMIC INTEREST GROUPS IN THE U.S.

U.S. ANTI-COMMUNIST IDEOLOGY

RED BAITING: TOUGH ON COMMUNISM WINS VOTES
INDIVIDUAL LEVEL EXPLANATIONS

THE LESSON OF MUNICH

OVER USE TRIGGERS SECURITY DILEMMA

ASSUMES ALL OPPONENTS ARE REVISIONIST POWERS

COGNITIVE BIASES

TRUMAN vs. ROOSEVELT
-- LAST AIDE’S ADVICE
-- INCONSISTANT STATEMENTS

MISPERCEPTION: THE FUNDAMENTAL ATTRIBUTION ERROR

SOVIET ACTIONS: HOSTILITY
U.S. ACTIONS: CIRCUMSTANCES
THE GREAT DEBATE

KENNAN VERSUS LIPPMANN

GEORGE KENNAN (Mr. X) = AMERICAN DIPLOMAT

RUSSIANS/SOVIETS ARE EXPANSIONIST

DETERRENT POLICY NEEDED FOR “CONTAINMENT”

IN LONG RUN, COMMUNISM WILL COLLAPSE

WALTER LIPPMANN = NEWSPAPER COLUMNIST

COSTLY AND MILITARISTIC

UNDERMINES DEMOCRACY

SECURITY DILEMMA

BOTH ARTICLES WRITTEN AT THE START OF THE COLD WAR
-- WHAT POLICY SHOULD THE U.S. ADOPT?
WHY IS THE BIRTH OF THE COLD WAR IMPORTANT?

1947

Today

MASSIVE REDISTRIBUTION OF POWER

GREAT UNCERTainty AS TO INTENTIONS

LESSONS OF THE COLD WAR

SECURITY DILEMMA

APPLICABILITY OF THE LESSON OF MUNICH

WEAKNESS OF RUSSIA & CHINA WILL LEAD TO BALANCING

U.S. ANTI-COMMUNIST IDEOLOGY HINDERS COMPROMISE
The Cold War

The MSS Examples
The stag hunt is an allegory that originated in the writings of the Geneva-born eighteenth-century philosopher Jean Jacques Rousseau. In this allegory, five individual hunters exist in a state of nature, with no government or social structure to determine their behaviour. The hunters have a choice of cooperating to attain a mutually desired goal or defecting from such cooperation if their own individual short-term interests can be satisfied. They can collaborate to capture a stag, which will satisfy the food needs of all five hunters if they share it. To be successful, all five hunters must cooperate to encircle the stag. However, in doing so, it is possible that one of the hunters will encounter a hare, which will satisfy that individual hunter’s food needs. That hunter then faces a choice: let the hare go and serve the common interest by continuing the effort to capture the stag, or take the hare and defect from the group, thus ruining the hunt for the other four hunters, who will not have their food needs satisfied.

The allegory raises several questions about incentives and disincentives for cooperation. If a hunter prefers to cooperate to capture the stag, can the other hunters be trusted to do the same? Is it not in the rational self-interest of a hunter to take the hare? If this is the case, how can the hunters trust each other to cooperate on a hunt for the stag? And if they cannot trust each other, is it not in their interests to take the hare before any of the other hunters do? Indeed, what is the incentive to cooperate at all? The stag hunt allegory illustrates the difficulty of establishing cooperation in an anarchic environment and the corrosive effect short-term self-interest can have on collaborative efforts.